Behaviour-based price discrimination: the impact of an information asymmetry by Filipa Alexandra Pereira Rodrigues
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Behaviour-based price discrimination: the impact of an 
information asymmetry 
 
by 
 
Filipa Alexandra Pereira Rodrigues 
 
Master dissertation in Economics 
 Faculdade de Economia do Porto, Universidade do Porto 
 
Supervised by: 
Joana Resende 
 
September, 2017
 
 
 i 
Vita 
 
Filipa Alexandra Pereira Rodrigues was born on May 20th, 1994, in Porto, Portugal. 
After completing the secondary education, in 2012, at Colégio de Nossa Senhora do 
Rosário, in the area of Socioeconomics Sciences, with the average of 20 (out of 20), Filipa 
has continued her studies in Economics at Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do 
Porto (FEP). In 2015, the Bachelor in Economics was completed with an average of 17 
(out of 20). 
With the aim of deepening her knowledge on Economics, as well of acquiring the 
necessary abilities to pursue a solid career in the area, the Masters in Economics, once 
again in FEP, was the next logical step to take.  
Currently a finalist of this Master’s degree, Filipa is motivated to start her first 
professional experience, working for Deloitte Portugal, in September 2017.  
  
 
 
 ii 
Acknowledgements 
 
First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Joana Resende, whose contribute to this 
dissertation and, therefore, to my academic journey has been inestimable. Without her 
knowledge, patience, and commitment, this dissertation would have never been possible.   
Second, I want to thank my parents, who have always invested in my education, so 
that I could achieve every single one of my dreams, and who have been by my side 
through both the best and the hardest moments of my educational path and of my life.  
Thank you to my sister, Ana, who has always been exactly what a sister should be: 
my biggest support and my greatest competitor. A big part of who I am today, I owe to 
you. 
Thank you to the rest of my family for being by my side every step of the way and 
encouraging me to be better every day. 
Thank you to Micaela, whose support has been a constant throughout my journey 
at FEP, and with whom I have built a friendship I will always cherish.  
Thank you to Carlos, for his patience and unconditional support, and for believing 
in me even when I did not myself. 
Lastly, thank you to all my other friends and teachers who have crossed my path, 
both at CNS Rosário and at FEP. With each one of you I have learned something that has 
made a better person. 
  
 
 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
In the past, personalized price discrimination used to be a just theoretical topic, with 
little possibility of actually being implemented. However, with the recent technological 
evolution this theoretical topic became a reality. Nowadays, companies have the ability 
of gathering information about their customers’ behaviour, which can be used to segment 
them and price discriminate accordingly. 
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of behaviour-based pricing on 
price strategies and welfare outcomes when there is an information asymmetry between 
firms.  In order to achieve my objectives I will use two set-ups of a static duopoly model 
(with and without information asymmetry), inspired in Gehrig et al. (2011), and compare 
them with each other and with Gehrig et al. (2011). This research gives new insight on 
the effects of behaviour-based price discrimination and on the relevant aspects that impact 
firms and consumers, such as market growth and past choices. 
The results show that the entry of new customers in a market with information 
asymmetry between firms benefits the non-discriminating firm and helps reduce the 
strategic advantage the other firm has. This entry also plays an important (and somewhat 
similar) role when no information asymmetry is present, as it attenuates the dominance 
of the stronger firm. Moreover, the existence of an information asymmetry always 
benefits the firm that has the technological advantage and, in many cases, harms the rival. 
For consumers, the information asymmetry can be beneficial. Lastly, incorporating past 
decisions into the pricing strategies is always positive for consumers, but usually harms 
the firms. Our model, however, finds an exception to these results. When there is a strong 
preference for the price discriminating firm, the other firm might be benefitted by the 
inclusion of this aspect on the pricing strategies. 
 
JEL codes: D43, L11, L13  
Keywords: Price discrimination, Behaviour-based price discrimination, Customer 
Poaching, Information asymmetry 
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Resumo 
 
No passado, a discriminação de preços personalizada mais não era do que um tema 
teórico, com pouca possibilidade de ser aplicado na prática. Contudo, com a recente 
evolução tecnológica, essa possibilidade teórica tornou-se uma realidade. Atualmente, as 
empresas têm a capacidade de reunir informação sobre o comportamento dos 
consumidores, podendo segmentá-los e discriminar preços de acordo com esses 
segmentos.  
O objetivo desta dissertação é analisar o impacto da discriminação de preços com 
base no comportamento dos consumidores nas estratégias de preços e no bem-estar, num 
contexto em que existe assimetria de informação entre as empresas. Para esse efeito, 
utilizarei um modelo de duopólio estático com duas variantes (com e sem assimetria de 
informação), inspirado no modelo de Gehrig et al. (2011) e compararei os três entre si. 
Este trabalho permitirá obter novas conclusões sobre os efeitos deste tipo de 
discriminação de preços e sobre os aspetos, como o crescimento dos mercados e as opções 
passadas, que influenciam empresas e consumidores. 
Os resultados mostram que a entrada de novos consumidores num mercado com 
assimetria de informação ajuda a reduzir a vantagem estratégica da empresa com acesso 
a mais informação, beneficiando a outra empresa. Esta entrada desempenha também um 
papel fulcral (e, de certa forma, semelhante) quando não existe assimetria de informação, 
pois atenua o poder de mercado da empresa dominante. Além disso, a assimetria beneficia 
naturalmente a empresa capaz de discriminar preços e, em muitos casos, prejudica a rival, 
enquanto para os consumidores pode ser benéfica. Por último, incorporar as decisões 
passadas no processo de decisão estratégica dos preços é sempre positivo para os 
consumidores, mas tende a prejudicar as empresas. Existe, contudo, uma exceção: quando 
há uma preferência clara pela empresa que discrimina preços, a outra empresa pode sair 
beneficiada com a inclusão desse aspeto na definição das estratégias de preços. 
 
Códigos-JEL: D43, L11, L13  
 
 
 v 
Palavras-chave: Discriminação de preços, Discriminação de preços com base no 
comportamento dos consumidores, “Poaching” dos consumidores, Assimetria de 
informação 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
 
 In the past, personalized price discrimination was merely a theoretical topic as it 
was very hard to implement. However, due to technological evolution, nowadays 
companies have the ability to collect and trade big data and to communicate directly with 
customers. This allows them to segment their customers based on past behaviour and 
price discriminate accordingly.1 This new reality raises a number of issues regarding the 
optimal firms’ behaviour, its impact on consumers and the possible need for authorities 
to intervene in markets where such practices are common. For this reason, personalized 
price discrimination became an increasingly studied topic not only among academics, but 
also between big international institutions.  
According to the existent literature, in the case of a monopoly, price 
discrimination unequivocally reduces the consumer surplus. However, when companies 
face competition, the same may not remain true. For example, in the case of an oligopoly, 
literature predominantly defends that such practice benefits consumers, since it will lead 
to lower prices in order to attract customers who, otherwise, would prefer to buy the good 
from a rival company. As a result, political intervention in these cases is, in general, 
viewed as unnecessary.  
With this dissertation, I intend to deepen the study of behaviour-based price 
discrimination. I will focus not only on situations where all firms have the same ability to 
price discriminate, but also on cases in which there is an information asymmetry between 
companies regarding the customers’ past behaviour. This will allow me to understand 
what changes in price and welfare strategies when there is asymmetry on the firms' ability 
to customize prices. For this purpose, I will use Gehrig et al (2011) as a benchmark. 
Nevertheless, I will depart from that paper in one important aspect. While Gehrig et al 
(2011) study a duopoly market (with asymmetric information) where one of the firms 
used to always be a monopolist in the past, this dissertation studies a context where 
previous competition was held in the past, leaving firms with an inherited group of loyal 
clients. Given that consumers have selected their preferred firm in the past, in this 
dissertation I will take into consideration the customer’s past decisions as an element that 
                                                          
1 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Council of Economic Advisers (2015) mentions 
the new technological setting that facilitates personalized price discrimination, as well as the consequent 
authorities’ concerns. 
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influences the behaviour of the companies. Therefore, the dissertation will answer two 
questions. First, what is the impact of asymmetry on the degree of firm’s customized 
pricing effectiveness on market equilibrium (prices and profits) and on consumer 
welfare? And second, how does the consumer’s past behaviour influences the strategic 
decisions of the firms and, consequently, their profits? 
The rest of this dissertation will be divided in three parts. In section 2, I will 
present my literature review, including the key concepts of my dissertation, the historical 
context of the research questions and an analysis of the different contributions to the 
literature on behaviour-based price discrimination. Section 3 will be dedicated to the 
presentation of our model: section 3.1 presents the asymmetric behaviour-based price 
discrimination model and the analysis of its consequences in terms of prices, profits and 
consumer surplus; section 3.2 does the same for the scenario without information 
asymmetry; section 3.3 contains a comparison between those scenarios; and, finally, in 
section 3.4 there will be a comparison between our model and Gehrig et al (2011). 
Conclusions and suggestions for possible future lines of investigation are presented in 
section 4.  
  
 
 
 3 
2. Literature review 
 
Price discrimination has been a subject of study among economists for many 
years. A firm is price discriminating when it sets different prices for different consumers 
without any cost related reason. There are three main types of price discrimination: first 
degree price discrimination, which consists in charging the maximum price that each 
customer is available to pay and, therefore, capturing the entire surplus; second degree 
price discrimination, which means charging different prices based on the quantity 
consumed, and third degree price discrimination, which is the act of setting different 
prices for different groups of customers.  The initial concern was to find out and analyze 
the implications of such practice in monopolistic markets. However, in most markets 
firms face competition. In fact, imperfect competition is the most common economic 
setting. For this reason academics progressively started to focus on the effects of price 
discrimination in competitive markets. Also, this type of studies has become increasingly 
relevant in recent years due to technological evolution2. Indeed, firms’ recent ability to 
collect and process big data and to communicate with customers in a personalized way 
has created an environment in which firms have access to information about their 
customers and can use it to price discriminate. Due to this new reality, different types of 
price discrimination, such as location based price discrimination or behaviour-based price 
discrimination, became possible to implement. The latter is the subject of this dissertation 
and consists in setting different prices based on the consumers’ past behaviour. For 
instance, a firm can set a lower price to historic rivals’ customers than to its own loyal 
customers in order to poach them. Customer poaching means “capturing” the rivals’ 
customers, making them choose to buy your product instead. Since technology has made 
this kind of practice increasingly easier to implement, it comes as no surprise that 
literature on the topic is vast and diverse. 
 Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) are the two seminal papers that 
started this wave of studies. Both papers focus on the implications of behaviour-based 
price discrimination in duopolistic markets in the context of a dynamic model with two 
periods. However, their approach is quite different. In Chen (1997), consumers face 
                                                          
2 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Council of Economic Advisers (2015) 
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switching costs when they change their supplier. This is a key ingredient of this model 
since in equilibrium consumers’ poaching is actually driven by switching costs. 
Differently, in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) poaching is information-based: firms offer 
horizontally differentiated products and consumers have a preference for one of the two 
firms. In this model, price discrimination can only happen in the second period because 
firms need the first period to get to know the consumers’ behaviour and, therefore, their 
preferences. 
According to Chen (1997), higher switching costs result in more price 
discrimination in equilibrium. A mature market is more competitive when price 
discrimination is possible, but even under this condition prices increase with the expected 
switching costs. Under this practice, firms are worse-off and consumers are not always 
better-off. There is a dead-weight loss for society due to inefficient switching. The results 
obtained in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) are slightly different. In an attempt to poach 
from rival companies, each firm sets a lower price in the second period than the one that 
would be set if only uniform pricing strategies were possible. However, the opposite 
happens in the first period. Assuming consumers are not myopic, they understand prices 
will decrease in time and their demand becomes less elastic. This results in higher prices 
in the first period. This model was extended to an infinite horizon in Villas-Boas (1999) 
and the conclusions regarding prices remained true. Consumers were proven to benefit 
from behaviour-based price discrimination while the opposite happened to firms. Society 
as a whole is worse-off. These three papers come to the same conclusion regarding 
welfare. However, there are dynamic models in which society is better-off with price 
discrimination. For instance, in Esteves (2010) that is the case. The main difference 
between this paper and both Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Villas-Boas (1999) lies on 
the distribution of consumers’ tastes, since Esteves (2010) considers that the distribution 
of consumer types is discrete (introducing price discrimination in the set-up proposed by 
Shilony (1977)). The conclusions regarding prices are more in agreement with the ones 
found under the switching costs approach than the information-based one. 
 The models mentioned so far are all dynamic, but there are also papers using static 
models to study behaviour-based price discrimination. For example, Corts (1998) 
presents a duopoly model with vertically differentiated firms and two different groups of 
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consumers. A distinction is made between best-response symmetry and best-response 
asymmetry. A market exhibits best-response symmetry when the strong and weak 
segments of each firm coincide, while best-response asymmetry is present when one 
firm’s strong market is the other firm’s weak segment3. In the first case, Corts (1998) 
obtains that the uniform price lies between the two discriminatory prices and the welfare 
effects are ambiguous. In the second case, one of two situations may occur: all prices may 
fall or all prices may increase when firms adopt price discrimination strategies. If all 
prices fall, it is found that competitive price discrimination may intensify competition and 
lead to lower prices. In this case, there is a prisoner dilemma situation in equilibrium, 
with firms’ profits decreasing under price discrimination. This can constitute an incentive 
to stop the competitive unprofitable behaviour and commit to uniform pricing. When all 
prices increase, the opposite happens and consumers are worse-off with price 
discrimination, while firms are better-off.  
 Armstrong and Vickers (2001) study a duopoly model with heterogeneous 
consumers (different transportation costs). It is shown that price discrimination tends to 
be desirable in sufficiently competitive conditions. In this situation, total welfare 
increases when price discrimination is possible. However, when consumers are divided 
in identifiable separate markets both consumer surplus and total welfare suffer from this 
type of practice. In fact, only profits increase. One of these authors presented another 
paper, Armstrong (2009), focused on three different aspects: the information about 
customers available to firms; the instruments firms can use in the design of their tariffs; 
and the ability of firms to commit to their pricing plans. This paper shows that with 
competition, the effects of price discrimination on profit, consumer surplus and overall 
welfare depend on the information and on the tariff instruments available to firms. It is 
possible that the ability to commit to prices damages industry profit. 
 Two other very important models to study the implications of price discrimination 
are Shaffer and Zhang (2000) and Thisse and Vives (1988). Both the studies have slightly 
different approaches from the models above. For instance, Shaffer and Zhang (2000) 
propose a duopoly model with two unequal sized groups of consumers. When demand is 
symmetric, it is optimal to charge a lower price to a rival’s customer. When demand is 
                                                          
3 Note that the best response asymmetry set-up was also considered in Thisse and Vives (1988), which is 
mentioned below. 
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asymmetric, it may happen that a firm offers a discount to its own customers and that 
price discrimination lessens competition instead of intensifying it. The conclusion is that 
a firm should charge a lower price to the more price-elastic consumer group, whether it 
is the competitor’s customers or not. Also, the more price-elastic group does not have to 
be the same for both firms. Thisse and Vives (1988) have an even more different 
approach. They present a duopoly model in which firms and consumers are located in a 
n-dimensional space and price discrimination is based on the consumer’s location. The 
conclusion is that there is a strong tendency for firms to choose a discriminatory policy, 
despite the fact that they may end up worse than if they had chosen uniform pricing 
(prisoner dilemma outcome). Prices faced by consumers are lower than with uniform 
pricing and welfare is not affected. 
Differently, Esteves (2009) obtained that behaviour-based price discrimination 
can be profitable, corroborating Armstrong and Vickers (2001). Using a duopoly model 
where consumers have both different product preferences and brand loyalty degree, the 
author studied the impact of price discrimination in firms’ welfare when they only have 
information about one of the two differences between customers. Price discrimination 
was found to be profitable when firms have access to the right information but remain 
ignorant about the rest. Therefore, Esteves (2009) concluded that partial information can 
be the key factor for avoiding the prisoners’ dilemma when implementing behaviour-
based price discrimination.    
The following table (table 1) summarizes and compares the conclusions of the 
previous papers. A minus sign means a smaller value when there is price discrimination 
in comparison to a situation in which prices are uniform. A plus sign means a higher value 
with price discrimination than in a context of uniform pricing. “NA” means there is no 
information available and a question mark represents an ambiguous situation. 
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 Paper Prices 
Consumer 
Surplus 
Profits Welfare 
Static Models 
Thisse and 
Vives (1998) 
- NA - No effect 
Corts (1998)4 - + - 
+ 
(if the output 
increases) 
Shaffer and 
Zhang (2000)5 
- + - NA 
Armstrong and 
Vickers (2001) 
- + + + 
Esteves 
(2009)6 
NA NA + NA 
 
1st 
period 
2nd 
period  
Dynamic 
Model 
(switching 
costs) 
Chen (1997) - - ? - - 
Dynamic 
Models  
(brand 
preferences) 
Fundenberg 
and Tirole 
(2000) 
+ - NA NA - 
Villas-Boas 
(1999) 
+ - + - - 
Esteves (2010) - - + - + 
 
Table 1 – Summary of the conclusions found in the literature regarding behavior-based price discrimination 
in markets with symmetric firms 
 
 So far we have focused on duopoly models where both firms are symmetric and, 
therefore, have the same ability to price discriminate. However, reality is not necessarily 
like that. In many markets, there are dominant firms. For this reason it is important to 
verify to what extent dominant firms can use behaviour-based price discrimination to 
reinforce their dominant position. It is also relevant to analyze if this type of practice can 
constitute a barrier to entry. Both of these issues raise awareness to the possible necessity 
of antitrust legislation to limit or forbid firms with higher market power to engage in this 
type of pricing strategies. 
                                                          
4 These conclusions are only valid when there is best-response asymmetry (in the case in which all prices 
fall). 
5 These conclusions are only valid when demand is symmetric. 
6 This is only true when firms have access to the right information but remain ignorant about the rest. 
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 Armstrong and Vickers (1993) is a first study about this subject. It is based on a 
one-period model with a dominant firm serving a monopolistic segment and competing 
with an entrant in a competitive segment. An asymmetric no-discrimination constraint 
across segments is shown to lead to a lower price in the monopolistic segment and to 
higher prices in the competitive one, when the entry occurs. These results may not seem 
beneficial for society if the competitive segment is big. However, when there are no 
constraints to price discrimination, there is generally less entry. This can justify the 
existence of constraints on price discrimination strategies. 
 In Chen (2008) it is analyzed a similar model but in a dynamic setting. An 
incumbent has a monopolistic position in one segment and competes with a more efficient 
firm in another segment. Price discrimination raises prices for the monopolistic segment 
in both periods and raises prices in the competitive segment in the first period but lowers 
them in the following periods. The overall effect is beneficial for the consumers as long 
as the more efficient firm is not forced to exit the market. When that happens, there seems 
to be reason for authorities to act since the trade-off between present price reductions and 
future price increases will harm consumers. Bouckaert et al. (2013) also consider a model 
with an incumbent and a rival, but only with two periods. Two types of asymmetric no-
discrimination constraints are incorporated in the model: asymmetric no-discrimination 
constraints within the competitive segment (the dominant firm cannot practice behaviour-
based price discrimination in the competitive segment in order to poach the rivals’ 
customers) and asymmetric no-discrimination constraints across segments (the dominant 
firm cannot set a different price for the monopolistic segment and for the competitive 
segment). The first type of constraint lowers prices to both firms while the second type 
of constraint increases them.  When the monopolistic segment is large enough, the effect 
of the constraint across segments outweighs the effect of the constraint within the 
competitive segment, which means that profits increase. However, the profits of the 
dominant firm increase when the effect of the constraint across segments is less 
pronounced. Both firms’ profits suffer most when the monopolistic segment is small. The 
asymmetric no-discrimination constraint increases total welfare as well as consumer 
welfare when the monopolistic segment is not too large and entry is profitable. When the 
monopolistic segment is large, the results are more in line with the ones from Armstrong 
and Vickers (1993). 
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 Mahmood and Vulkan (2013) study a similar two-period model, in which firms 
can only price discriminate in the second period. The main difference towards all the 
models mentioned until this point is that this is not a duopoly model. In fact, one of the 
objectives of this paper is to understand how price behaviour varies with the number of 
firms operating in the market. The conclusion is that the higher the number of firms, the 
less likely it is to price discriminate. The other objective is similar to what the previous 
models have focused on: study the relation between pricing behaviour and market 
dominance. According to this paper, in asymmetric markets, large firms are more likely 
to extract surplus from existing customers and offer discounts the new customers, 
whereas small firms tend to offer similar prices. The difference in prices between existing 
and new customers is on average greater for symmetric duopoly firms than to the 
dominant firm in the asymmetric scenario, which contradicts economic theory and 
common sense. Therefore, existing customers might be more disadvantaged in markets 
with equal sized competitors. Behaviour-based price discrimination is unlikely to raise 
antitrust concerns as markets become more competitive and consumers benefit from 
lower prices. This suggests that encouraging entry might be a better policy than regulating 
dominant firms. 
 Contrary to the previous models, Carroni (2016) argues that, when firms are 
asymmetric and consumers are less sophisticated than firms (less forward-looking), 
behaviour-based price discrimination may weaken price competition and be detrimental 
to consumers. This is a two-period duopoly model, similar to Bouckaert et al. (2013). 
However, in this case, the dominance of a firm is defined by the consumers’ willingness 
to pay a price premium for their product. In this context, new conclusions arise. It is 
shown that, under big asymmetries between firms, the strong firm trades off current 
market share for future market share, while the weak firm adapts to that strategy by doing 
the opposite. This means, on one hand, that the strong firm accommodates the weak firm 
and sets high prices, enjoying high margins in spite of their relatively small market share. 
On the other hand, the weak firm enjoys the lessened competition in the first period and 
achieves a large market share, but is unable to compete in the second period. The strong 
firm poaches many consumers, if not all of them. In any case, both firms benefit from this 
strategy, even if the weak firm is forced to abandon the market. When consumers are 
myopic, this behaviour may result in a somehow collusive pricing behaviour. This 
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possibility raises concerns regarding the amount of information about the customers that 
companies should have access to. 
 Gehrig et al. (2011) study a slightly different situation. In this static duopoly 
model, one firm can price discriminate while the other cannot. However, this is not a 
result of any constraint imposed by antitrust authorities. In this model, there is an 
incumbent firm - that used to be a monopolist - and an entrant. The incumbent already 
knows the clients and can distinguish between former clients and new clients. The same 
does not hold true for the entrant. Therefore, the practice of behaviour-based price 
discrimination is only possible for the incumbent.  The objective of this paper is to analyze 
whether or not this information asymmetry between the firms can represent a barrier to 
entry and if antitrust authorities have a reason to limit price discrimination in markets 
such as this one. It was found that consumers loyal to the incumbent are better off with 
uniform pricing, whereas new consumers are better off with price discrimination. 
Consumer surplus is higher under uniform pricing. Also, history-based price 
discrimination does not encourage nor discourage market entry and, therefore, it does not 
affect the persistence of the incumbent’s market dominance. This implies that the 
potential abuse of market dominance caused by history-based price discrimination is 
exploitation and not exclusion. A ban on price discrimination would benefit consumers, 
but would not interfere in the decision to enter the market. Gehrig et al. (2012) compares 
this model to a similar one in which both firms have access to information about the 
consumers’ past behaviour (although ignoring the existence of new consumers in the 
market). It also compares the new model with an uniform pricing setting. This analysis 
shows that it is beneficial for consumers that both companies are able apply behaviour-
based price discrimination. In this case, consumer surplus increases as long as the 
switching costs are not too high and the inherited degree of dominance is not too weak. 
My work will also be based on a comparison with the model presented by Gehrig et al. 
(2011). However, instead of comparing it just to a model without information asymmetry, 
I will change some of the assumptions. I will not have a model with an entrant. Instead 
there will be two different set-ups: one with a persistent information asymmetry caused 
by the two firms not entering the market at the same time; and another without 
information asymmetry for comparison purposes (which can be interpreted as the 
situation that would exist in the market after the last firm to enter the market was able to 
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catch up with the level of information gathered by the incumbent). Considering the 
existence of previous competition between the firms, allows me to take into consideration 
the consumers past preferences and check how that alters the pricing decisions and, 
consequently, how it influences the profitability of the firms and the consumers’ welfare. 
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3. The model 
 
This model is an extension of Gehrig et al. (2011)’s model that assumes previous 
competition between the firms.  
Consider a horizontally differentiated Hotelling market with full coverage where 
two firms, A and B, compete on prices in a one-period setting. The firms are located at 
the opposite extremes of the Hotelling line [0,1]. Firm A is located on the left side of the 
interval and firm B is located on the right side of it. While on Gehrig et al. (2011), firm 
A is assumed have been a monopolist in the past, that faces competition from firm B for 
the first time, here both firms were already operating in the market. Thus, there is at least 
one competitive period before our analysis starts. For this reason, there is an important 
variable added to our model, that corresponds to firm A’s loyal market segment – x1.  
For simplicity, assume that the consumers are uniformly distributed on the interval 
[0,1]. Also, assume a proportion θ of the consumers is replaced by new consumers, who 
are also distributed uniformly on [0,1]. Because they are new to the market, no firm has 
information about them, creating a new dynamic channel of strategic interaction which 
could not be captured in the static model by Gehrig et al. (2011). The remaining customers 
are also uniformly distributed. All consumers are distributed in the unit interval according 
to increased preference for brand B. Each customer buys one unit of the product from one 
of the firms. Old customers face switching costs, which means firms need to create 
incentives to be able to capture their rival’s clients, namely through behaviour-based price 
discrimination. Marginal production costs are assumed to be equal for both firms.  
To study the impacts of information asymmetry, let us assume firm A has some 
sort of advantage over firm B in terms of the ability to gather information about the 
clients’ behaviour – a technological advantage. There are various possible explanations 
for such situation, some of which as simple as having different budgets to invest in this 
type of technology. However, for comparison reasons, perhaps the easiest explanation is 
considering firm A to be a long installed firm in the market and firm B a relatively new 
one. This approximates the present model to Gehrig et al. (2011). For instance, it could 
represent a follow-up of that model (for example, a second period).  
Two scenarios will be considered: one in which only the incumbent firm can price 
discriminate (it takes time until the new firm is able to match the information the 
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incumbent firm already has); and one in which, after observing what happened in the past, 
both firms have enough knowledge to segment the market and price discriminate 
accordingly (the information asymmetry does not last). The market is divided into three 
categories of customers: the old customers who bought the firm’s product in the first 
period, those who chose the rival’s product in the first period and the new customers 
entering the market only in the second period. When firms have the ability to segment 
their clients into these categories, behaviour-based price discrimination emerges as a 
strategy to attract more customers and to poach the rival’s customers.  
I will use backward induction to determine the Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Then, I will analyze the results in order to study the impact of the initial information 
asymmetry on the pricing strategies and its consequences. This will allow me to 
understand to what extent this asymmetry influences the results of the firms and impacts 
consumers. At the same time, I will check what changes when past decisions are taken 
into consideration in the pricing strategies.  
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3.1. Asymmetric behaviour-based pricing 
 
In this scenario, firm A is able to separate “old” and “new” consumers in the 
market. Moreover, it is also able to identify the consumers who chose each of the brands 
in the previous period. As a result, it is possible for firm A to segment its clients and price 
discriminate accordingly, meaning behaviour-based price discrimination is an option. The 
prices set by firm A are pa, qa and za for the consumers who chose brand A in both 
periods, those who switch from brand A to B in the second period and new customers, 
respectively. On the other hand, firm B has no way of knowing the clients’ past behaviour. 
As a result, firm B sets the price pb to all consumers.  
Old customers face an exogenous switching cost σ when they switch from one 
brand to the other. The transportation cost faced by each customer is represented by τ. β 
is the benefit for each customer of consuming the product they chose to purchase and it 
is assumed to be high enough to guarantee that the market is covered in all periods.  
The utility function of an old consumer who has purchased a unit of the product 
of firm A in the previous period indexed by x is then: 
  
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − pa − τ𝑥   if continues to purchase brand A
𝛽 − pb − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥) − 𝜎    if switches to brand B
                                  (1) 
  
 Let 𝑥a represent a consumer, who previously preferred brand A and is now 
indifferent between purchasing A and B. As this consumer chose A in the previous period, 
he is located on the interval [0 , 𝑥1], assuming preferences remain the same. This requires 
β – pa – τ 𝑥a = β – pb – τ(1 – 𝑥a) – σ to be true for this consumer. Therefore,  
 
 𝑥a = 
1
2
+
𝜎+pb−pa
2𝜏
  ,  𝑥a є [0 , 𝑥1]                                                                       (1.1) 
 
Recall that  𝑥1 is the consumer that, in the past, was indifferent between A and B. 
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The utility function of an old consumer who has purchased a unit of the product 
of firm B in the previous period is: 
 
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − pb − τ(1 − 𝑥)   if continues to purchase brand B
𝛽 − qa − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝜎                           if switches to brand A
                       (2) 
 
Let 𝑥b represent a consumer, who previously preferred brand B and is now 
indifferent between purchasing A and B. Assuming the preferences of a consumer do not 
change from one period to the other, we know a consumer who bought B in the past is 
located on the interval [𝑥1 , 1]. Accordingly, for the indifferent consumer, it must be the 
case that β – pb – τ(1 – xb) = β – qa – τ 𝑥b – σ , so that: 
 
𝑥b = 
1
2
+
pb−qa−𝜎
2𝜏
 ,  𝑥b є [𝑥1 , 1]                                                                        (2.1) 
 
The utility function of a new consumer indexed by x is: 
 
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − za − τ𝑥                 if purchases brand A
𝛽 − pb − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥)    if purchases brand B
                                          (3) 
 
Let 𝑥n represent a new consumer who is indifferent between purchasing A and B. 
This requires β – za - τx = β – pb – τ(1 – 𝑥n) to be true for this consumer. Therefore, 
 
𝑥n = 
1
2
+
pb−za
2𝜏
                                                                                                  (3.1) 
In order to have a meaningful model, we need to guarantee that each consumer is 
in the selected location. In other words, we must assure xb > xa. Plotting 1.1 and 2.1 in the 
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previous expression, we get x1 > 
𝜎
τ
 as a necessary condition. For this reason, for the rest of 
this model’s analysis x1 > 
𝜎
τ
  will be an assumption. 
Assumption 1: x1 > 
𝜎
τ
 
 
The following picture represents the Hotelling lines illustrating equilibrium 
market segmentation in the case of old consumers (the first Hotelling line) and in the case 
of new consumers (the second Hotelling line). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Consumer allocation between horizontally differentiated brands A and B in a context 
with information asymmetry. Bottom: (1-θ) old consumers. Top: θ new consumers. 
 
Since firm A is able to price discriminate, firm A chooses pa, qa and za in order to 
maximize its profit,  
πa = (1 - θ)[( pa - c) 𝑥a + (qa - c)( 𝑥b – 𝑥1)] + θ(za – c) 𝑥n 
Instead, firm B who does not have access to the price discrimination technology 
(or is unable to gather information on consumers’ previous choices) chooses pb in order 
to maximize its profit, 
πb = (1 - θ)[( pb - c)((1 - 𝑥b) + (𝑥1 – 𝑥a))] + θ(pb – c)(1 - 𝑥n). 
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Proposition 1: When firm A has a privileged access to the price discrimination 
technology (leading to asymmetric adoption of BBPD strategies), the equilibrium prices 
are: 
pa = c + 
𝜎
2
 + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
  
pb = c + 
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−2𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1−2
𝜃−2
 
qa = c - 
𝜎
2
 - 
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−5𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1+4
𝜃−2
 
za = c + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
 
 
so that the equilibrium price differential in equilibrium is equal to: 
pa - pb = −
1
6(𝜃−2)
(6𝜎 + 4𝜏 − 3𝜃𝜎 − 4𝜃𝜏 − 2𝜏𝑥1 + 2θτ𝑥1) 
qa - pb = −
1
6(𝜃−2)
(4𝜏 − 6𝜎 + 3𝜃𝜎 − 4𝜃𝜏 − 14𝜏𝑥1 + 8θτ𝑥1) 
za - pb = −
1
3
𝜏 
𝜃−1
𝜃−2
(𝑥1 − 2) 
Proof: see the Appendix  
 
In light of the equilibrium prices described above, Corollary 1 allows us to 
characterize the sub-sets of consumers who buy good A and good B.  The old consumers 
located in [0, 𝑥𝑎] or [𝑥1, 𝑥𝑏] and the new consumers located in [0, 𝑥𝑛] buy good A, 
whereas the remaining consumers end up buying good B, instead. 
 
Corollary 1:  In a scenario of asymmetric information, with firm A having access 
unilateral access to the price discrimination technology (leading to asymmetric adoption 
of BBPD strategies), the equilibrium market segmentation is such that: 
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xa = 
1
4
𝜎
𝜏
+
1
6
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
 
xb = −
𝜎
4𝜏
+
1
6
𝜃−7𝑥1+4𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
 
xn = 
1
6
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
 
Proof: The expressions in corollary 1 can be obtained by plugging the equilibrium prices 
obtained in Proposition 1, in the expressions (1.1), (2.1) and (3.1). 
 
From proposition 1, it becomes clear the price discriminating firm – firm A – sets 
a higher price for its old and loyal customers and a lower price to the customers they are 
trying to poach (pa – qa = σ + τ𝑥1). This is the expected result based on the existent 
literature7.  
In addition, the consumers’ past behaviour affects the price decisions. For 
instance, an increase in 𝑥1 has a positive impact on the prices set by firm A to its loyal 
customers and a negative impact on the prices for former firm B customers, as expected. 
With a higher 𝑥1, the segment of firm A’s loyal customers increases and allows the firm 
to practice higher prices without losing clients and, at the same time, attract the rival’s 
clients by setting a lower price for them. Moreover, 𝑥1 has a positive impact on the price 
set by the incumbent firm on the segment of the new customers and on firm B’s uniform 
price. Facing a strong segment of clients loyal to firm A and without the possibility of 
price discriminating, firm B faces a difficult situation (given the rival’s ability to set low 
prices to poach clients who previously preferred B and to gather clients on the segment 
of new consumers). Unable to enter a price war, firm B opts for increasing prices in an 
attempt to profit. Otherwise, firm B would have to set a low price to try to compete with 
firm A’s ability to price discriminate. Having a competitive disadvantage towards its 
rival, firm B would risk losing clients and potentially not gaining enough new ones to 
profit. Also, the fact that firm A softens its price strategy towards loyal clients might work 
                                                          
7 See, for instance, Chen (2005), Shaffer and Zhang (2000) and Gehrig et al (2011). 
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as an incentive for firm B to set higher prices for those clients. As the firm’s price is 
uniform, all segments of the market are affected by this decision.    
The impacts of a change of the transportation costs are a little more complex. In 
the new segment, an increase in τ generates an increase of za if (θ - 𝑥1+ θ𝑥1 - 4) < 0 and 
a decrease otherwise. For the old customers, an increase in τ means: an increase in pa if 
(θ - 𝑥1 + θ𝑥1 - 4) < 0 and a decrease otherwise; an increase in pb if (θ + 2𝑥1- 2θ𝑥1 + 2) > 
0 and a decrease otherwise (since 𝑥1< 1, the expression is always positive); and, finally, 
an increase in qa if (θ + 5𝑥1 - 2θ𝑥1 - 4) < 0 and a decrease otherwise. When we restrict θ 
and 𝑥1 to the interval of possible values the conclusions become simpler than it initially 
seemed. For instance, in line with standard Hotelling models we obtain that pa, za and pb 
always increase with τ. However, qa can decrease with an increase of τ, though that is not 
the case for most values. In fact, it only happens when firm A has a very strong inherited 
dominance (x1 higher than 0.8), especially when the percentage of new consumers is 
small.  
Figure 2 below depicts the impact of the transportation cost on the degree of 
product differentiation. In the “+” area, prices targeted to the rival’s old customers are 
increasing with τ, whereas in the “-” area, they are decreasing with τ.8 
 
Figure 2 - Impact of τ on the price set by firm A to the poached clients (qa). 
                                                          
8 The domain is restricted to x1 > 0.5 due to the assumption x1 > 
𝜎
τ
. 
 
+ - 
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A possible explanation for these results is that an increase on transportation costs 
leads firm A to increase prices to its loyal segment and, to benefit from it, firm B increases 
its price as well. Also, a high percentage of new consumers in the market (which implies 
a smaller percentage of old consumers) helps lessening the competition in the old 
segment. So, for most values, all prices will be higher for old customers with an increase 
of the transportation costs. However, when 𝑥1 is high enough and there are not many new 
customers (firm A has a very strong position in the market and wants to maintain it), the 
possibility of a future entrance of new customers might be perceived as a threat to that 
position, making the dominant firm act in order to poach its rival’s previous clients. In 
fact, with a very strong base of loyal clients, firm A is able to increase the demand for its 
product significantly by poaching the rival’s clients without risking a price war 
(remember that B sets an uniform price and, therefore, to benefit from the increase of pa 
and given that firm A’s loyal segment is big, pb still needs to increase).  
The unit increase of production costs is completely passed through to all prices in 
the market. This means, an unit increase on c generates an unit increase on pa, qa, za and 
pb. Moreover, it is possible to conclude that all prices rise when the proportion of new 
consumers in the market increases. Accordingly, the model predicts that prices are higher 
in expanding markets than in markets in which the proportion of consumers entering the 
market is rather small, regardless of the previous supplier of old consumers. 
Finally, switching costs only affect the prices set by the discriminating firm on the 
segment of old customers. When substitution costs increase, the price for loyal customers 
increases as well, whereas the prices for previous firm B customers decrease (since 
poached consumers need to be compensated for the extra switching cost they incur when 
they switch from one brand to the other). Thus, in the old customers’ segment, the 
existence of switching costs allows the price-discriminating firm to set higher prices to 
its loyal customers at the cost of setting lower prices to the poached customers, as the 
literature predicts. This works as an incentive to switch firms in a context where that 
change becomes more costly.  
 
Profits 
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 From proposition 2 and the profit expressions, it is possible to find the equilibrium 
profits for firms A and B. 
In equilibrium, the profits of each firm are: 
πa= −
1
36
 (
18𝜎2+32𝜏2+9𝜃2𝜎2+2𝜃2𝜏2+26𝜏2x1
2−27𝜃𝜎2−16𝜃𝜏2−32𝜏2x1+8𝜃
2𝜏2𝑥12
𝜏(𝜃−2)
 + 
40𝜃𝜏2x1−34𝜃𝜏
2x1
2−88𝜃2𝜏2x1+36𝜎𝜏x1+18𝜃
2𝜎𝜏x1−54𝜃𝜎𝜏x1
𝜏(𝜃−2)
) 
πb= − 
1
18
 𝜏
(−𝜃−2x1+2𝜃x1−2)
2
𝜃−2
 
 
We will now do a comparative static analysis in order to identify the impact of the 
different exogenous variables on the firms’ equilibrium profits, as we previously did with 
the prices. The effect of x1 on the profits is not necessarily the same for every value of 
that variable.  
𝑑
𝑑𝑥1
(𝜋𝑎) = −
𝜃−1
18𝜃−36
 (16τ - 18σ + 9θσ - 4θτ - 26τ𝑥1 + 8θτ𝑥1)                        (4.1) 
            
𝑑
𝑑𝑥1
(𝜋𝑏) =  
1
9
 
𝜏
𝜃−2
(2𝜃 − 2)(𝜃 + 2𝑥1 − 2𝜃𝑥1 + 2)                                         (4.2) 
  
From (4.1) it is possible to conclude that the impact of an increase in 𝑥1 over the 
profits of firm A is positive if (16τ - 18σ + 9θσ - 4θτ - 26τ𝑥1 + 8θτ𝑥1) < 0 and negative 
otherwise. From (4.2) it is clear the effect of x1 on the profits of the firm that does not 
have the ability to price discriminate is positive if (𝜃 + 2𝑥1 − 2𝜃𝑥1 + 2) > 0 and negative 
otherwise. Given that the percentage of new clients is necessarily inferior to one, we have 
that the profits of the non-discriminating firm are always positively influenced by the 
position of 𝑥1. 
Assuming, for simplification, τ = 1 and σ = 0.5, we have, as expected, that same 
result. The same conclusion is true for the price-discriminating firm. Thus, under our 
assumptions, if firm A’s loyal base of clients increases, so do the profits of both firms. 
 
 
 22 
Regarding the portion of new consumers (θ), the effects over the profits are 
somewhat harder to analyse. 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑎) =  − 
1
36𝜏(𝜎−2)2
(9𝜃2𝜎2 + 18𝜃2𝜎𝜏𝑥1 + 8𝜃
2𝜏2𝑥1
2 − 8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1 +
2𝜃2𝜏2 − 36𝜃𝜎2 − 72𝜃𝜎𝜏𝑥1 − 32𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1
2 + 32𝜃𝜏2𝑥1 − 8𝜃𝜏
2 + 36𝜎2 + 72𝜎𝜏𝑥1 +
42𝜏2𝑥1
2 − 48𝜏2𝑥1)                                                                                                      (5.1)      
 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑏) =  
1
18
𝜏
(𝜃−2)2
(−4𝜃2𝑥1
2 + 4𝜃2𝑥1 − 𝜃
2 + 16𝜃𝑥1
2 − 16𝜃𝑥1 + 4𝜃 −
12𝑥1
2 + 12)                                                                                                                 (5.2) 
 
From (5.1) it is possible to observe that the impact of θ on the incumbent firm 
profits is positive if (9𝜃2𝜎2 + 18𝜃2𝜎𝜏𝑥1 + 8𝜃
2𝜏2𝑥1
2 − 8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1 + 2𝜃
2𝜏2 − 36𝜃𝜎2 −
72𝜃𝜎𝜏𝑥1 − 32𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1
2 + 32𝜃𝜏2𝑥1 − 8𝜃𝜏
2 + 36𝜎2 + 72𝜎𝜏𝑥1 + 42𝜏
2𝑥1
2 − 48𝜏2𝑥1) < 
0 and positive otherwise. On the other hand, according to (5.2), the effect on firm B’s 
profits is positive if (−4𝜃2𝑥1
2 + 4𝜃2𝑥1 − 𝜃
2 + 16𝜃𝑥1
2 − 16𝜃𝑥1 + 4𝜃 − 12𝑥1
2 + 12) 
> 0 and negative otherwise. 
Considering, again, τ = 1 and σ = 0.5, an increase of new consumers in the market 
always benefits the non-discriminating firm. However, the same is not necessarily true 
for the other firm. In fact, as can be seen below, for low enough values of both 𝑥1 and θ, 
an addition of the proportion of new consumers in the market is harmful for firm A. Thus, 
there is a range of values for these variables where the entry of new customers in the 
market comes as a disadvantage to the firm with the ability of price discriminating. This 
happens because the entry of new customers in the market attenuates the advantage of 
having loyal customers. 
In the following figure, a plus sign means the profits of firm A increase with an 
increase of the portion of new customers.9 
 
                                                          
9 The domain is restricted to x1 > 0.5 due to the assumption x1 > 
𝜎
τ
. 
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Figure 3 - Impact of θ on the profits of firm A. 
 
It is also relevant to study the impact of the switching costs on the profits. 
𝑑
𝑑𝜎
(𝜋𝑎) =  − 
1
2τ
 (θ - 1)(σ + τ𝑥1)                                                                      (6.1) 
𝑑
𝑑𝜎
(𝜋𝑏) =   0                                                                                                                  (6.2) 
  
If (σ + τ𝑥1) > 0, then the impact of σ on the profits of firm A is positive. This 
condition is true for all possible values of 𝑥1, which implies that an increase on the 
switching costs always increases the profits of the price-discriminating firm. Conversely, 
switching costs have no effect over the profits of the firm that does not price discriminate. 
The reason behind this conclusion is that there is no heterogeneity between clients 
regarding the switching cost (this cost is the same for all of the old clients) and firm B 
has no possibility of adjusting prices in order to only compensate the clients who actually 
switch firms. Therefore, this is not a factor the firm takes into consideration when setting 
a single price for the entire market. 
 
 
 
+ 
- 
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Lastly, we will look at the transportation costs. 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝜏
(𝜋𝑎) =  
1
36𝜏(𝜎−2)2
(9𝜃2𝜎2 − 8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1
2 + 8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1 − 2𝜃
2𝜏2 − 27𝜃𝜎2 +
34𝜃𝜏2𝑥1
2 − 40𝜃𝜏2𝑥1 + 16𝜃𝜏
2 + 18𝜎2 − 26𝜏2𝑥1
2 + 32𝜏2𝑥1 − 32𝜏²)                      (7.1) 
              
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑏) =  −
1
18(𝜃−2)2
(𝜃 + 2𝑥1 − 2𝜃𝑥1 + 2)
2                                                (7.2) 
   
The impact of the transportation costs on the profits of firm A is positive 
if (9𝜃2𝜎2 − 8𝜃2𝜏2x1
2 + 8𝜃2𝜏2x1 − 2𝜃
2𝜏2 − 27𝜃𝜎2 + 34𝜃𝜏2x1
2 − 40𝜃𝜏2x1 +
16𝜃𝜏2 + 18𝜎2 − 26𝜏2x1
2 + 32𝜏2x1 − 32𝜏²) < 0 and negative otherwise. The effect of 
the transportation costs on the profits of firm B is always positive. In fact, in the scenario 
we have been considering (τ = 1 and σ = 0.5), both firms are always benefited by an 
increase on transportation costs. 
 
Consumer surplus 
The consumer surplus when only firm A discriminates prices is given by: 
𝐶𝑆 = −
1
72
(
−144𝑐𝜏−18𝜎2−88𝜏2+9𝜃2𝜎2+2𝜃2𝜏2+144𝛽𝜏+26𝜏2𝑥1
2−27𝜃𝜎2−4𝜃𝜏2−80𝜏2𝑥1
𝜏
+
8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1
288𝜃𝜏2𝑥172𝑐𝜃𝜏−72𝜃𝛽𝜏−34𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1
2−8𝜃2𝜏2𝑥1−108𝜎𝜏𝑥1−54𝜃
2𝜎𝜏𝑥1+162𝜃𝜎𝜏𝑥1
𝜏
)           (8) 
 
The computations behind the computation of the Equilibrium CS are presented in 
Appendix.  
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3.2. Behaviour-based pricing 
 
 Let us now analyze the case in which both firms are able to distinguish old (1- θ) 
and new customers (θ). Also, they know which consumers chose each brand in the 
previous period and, as a result, their preferences. Therefore, both firms are in equal 
conditions to price discriminate in the second period. As in the previous model, the prices 
set by firm A are pa, qa and za for the consumers who chose brand A in both periods, 
those who switch from brand A to B in the second period and new customers, 
respectively. The notation is similar for the three prices set by firm B.  
The utility function of an old consumer who has purchased a unit of the product 
of firm A in the past indexed by x is: 
  
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − pa − τ𝑥   if continues to purchase brand A
𝛽 − qb − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥) − 𝜎    if switches to brand B
                                 (9) 
  
 Let xa represent a consumer, who previously preferred brand A, who is now 
indifferent between purchasing A and B. As this consumer chose A in the past, he is 
located on the interval [0 , 𝑥1], assuming preferences remain the same. This requires β – 
pa – τ 𝑥𝑎= β – qb – τ(1 – 𝑥𝑎) – σ to be true for this consumer. Therefore,  
 
 𝑥𝑎 = 
1
2
+
𝜎+qb−pa
2𝜏
  ,  𝑥𝑎  є [0 , 𝑥1]                                                                      (9.1) 
 
Recall that 𝑥1 is the consumer that, in the past, was indifferent between A and B. 
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The utility function of an old consumer who has purchased a unit of the product 
of firm B in the past is: 
 
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − pb − τ(1 − 𝑥)   if continues to purchase brand B
𝛽 − qa − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝜎                           if switches to brand A
                       (2) 
 
Let 𝑥𝑏 represent a consumer, who previously preferred brand B and is now 
indifferent between purchasing A and B. With persistent preferences, we know a 
consumer who previously bought B in the is located on the interval [𝑥1 , 1]. This requires 
β – pb – τ(1 – 𝑥𝑏) = β – qa – τ 𝑥𝑏 – σ to be true for this consumer. Therefore, 
 
𝑥𝑏 = 
1
2
+
pb−qa−𝜎
2𝜏
 ,  𝑥𝑏  є [𝑥1 , 1]                                                                        (2.1) 
 
The utility function of a new consumer indexed by x is: 
 
         U(𝑥) =  {
𝛽 − za − τ𝑥                 if purchases brand A
𝛽 − zb − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥)    if purchases brand B
                                        (10) 
 
Let 𝑥𝑛 represent a new consumer who is indifferent between purchasing A and B. 
This requires β – za - τ𝑥𝑛 = β – zb – τ(1 – 𝑥𝑛) to be true for this consumer. Therefore, 
 
𝑥𝑛 = 
1
2
+
zb−za
2𝜏
                                                                                                 (10.1) 
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As in the asymmetric model, it is necessary to guarantee that xb > xa. Plotting 9.1 
and 2.1 in the previous expression, we get τ > σ. For this reason, for the rest of this model’s 
analysis we will assume τ > σ. 
Assumption 2: τ > σ 
 
The following figure represents the Hotelling lines illustrating equilibrium market 
segmentation in the second period in the case of old consumers (the first Hotelling line) 
and in the case of new consumers (the second Hotelling line). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Consumer allocation between horizontally differentiated brands A and B with both 
firms following a behaviour-based price discrimination strategy. Bottom: (1-θ) old consumers. Top: θ new 
consumers. 
 
Since both firms are able to price discriminate, firm A chooses pa, qa and za in 
order to maximize its profit,  
πa = (1 - θ)[( pa - c) 𝑥𝑎  + (qa - c)( 𝑥𝑏 – 𝑥1)] + θ(za – c) 𝑥𝑛                                   
 
Using a similar reasoning, firm B chooses pb, qb and zb in order to maximize its 
profit,  
πb = (1 - θ)[( pb - c)(1 - 𝑥𝑏) + (qb - c)( 𝑥1 – 𝑥𝑎)] + θ(zb – c)(1 - 𝑥𝑛). 
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Proposition 2: When both firms have access to the price discrimination 
technology, the equilibrium prices are: 
pa = c + 
1
3
σ + 
1
3
τ + 
2
3
τ𝑥1;        pb = c + 
1
3
σ + τ - 
2
3
τ𝑥1;        qa = c - 
1
3
σ + τ - 
4
3
τ𝑥1;  
qb = c - 
1
3
σ - 
1
3
τ + 
4
3
τ𝑥1;          za = zb = c + τ        
                                                    
so that the equilibrium price differential in equilibrium is equal to: 
pa - pb = 
2
3
𝜏 (2𝑥1 − 1) 
qa - qb = −
4
3
𝜏 (2𝑥1 − 1) 
za - zb = 0 
Proof: See the appendix 
 
In light of the equilibrium prices described above, Corollary 2 allows us to 
characterize the sub-sets of consumers who buy good A and good B.  The old consumers 
located in [0, 𝑥𝑎] or [𝑥1, 𝑥𝑏] and the new consumers located in [0, 𝑥𝑛] buy good A, 
whereas the remaining consumers end up buying good B, instead. 
 
Corollary 2:  When both firms have access to the same information and to the 
price discrimination technology (leading to the adoption of BBPD strategies), the 
equilibrium market segmentation is such that: 
xa = 
1
2𝜏
(
1
3
𝜎 −
2
3
𝜏 +
2
3
𝜏𝑥1) +
1
2
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xb = 
1
2
−  
1
2𝜏
(
1
3
𝜎 −
2
3
𝜏𝑥1) 
xn = 
1
2
 
Proof: The expressions in corollary 2 can be obtained by plugging the equilibrium prices 
obtained in Proposition 2, in the expressions (9.1), (2.1) and (10.1). 
 
From Proposition 2, it is possible to conclude that in the segment of the new 
customers the switching costs and the behaviour in the past have no effect on the price 
decision. The fact that both firms are now able to price discriminate allows the firms to 
fully separate the markets and, therefore, in the segment of new consumers (without any 
previous consumption history), standard Hotelling results prevail. The same is not true 
for the old customers’ segment. In this segment, the existence of switching costs allows 
the firms to set higher prices to their loyal customers at the cost of setting lower prices to 
the poached customers. This result corroborates the conclusions found on the existent 
literature, namely in papers that consider switching costs, such as Chen (2005) and Gehrig 
et al (2011). Also, the consumers’ past behaviour has an impact on the price decisions. 
For instance, an increase in 𝑥1 has a positive impact on the prices set to those on the left 
of 𝑥1 and a negative impact on those on the right. In fact, pa and qb (prices to those on 
the left of the indifferent consumer) are only higher than pb and qa (prices to those on the 
left of the indifferent consumer), respectively, if firm A’s loyal base of clients is higher 
than half of the old customers segment, as can be observed in the price differentials. 
The impacts of a change on the transportation costs are a little more complex. In 
the new segment, an increase in τ always generates an increase on the prices, whose 
magnitude is the same for all the consumers (in fact a unit increase in the transportation 
cost parameter, increases prices in the new consumers segment exactly by the same 
amount). An increase in τ also generates an increase on the prices set to the old customers 
who do not change suppliers from one period to the other (loyal consumers). However, 
this may not be true for the poached customers. In fact, that will depend on the value of 
𝑥1. If 𝑥1 is high enough (higher than 
3
4
 ), when τ increases, qa decreases, and if 𝑥1 is low 
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enough (lower than 
1
4
 ), an increase on τ will result in a decrease on qb. Therefore, only 
in the interval [
1
4
, 
3
4
], corresponding to a situation in which firms’ asymmetry in the past 
was relatively mild (without strong dominance of any of the firms), will both prices 
simultaneously have the same behaviour as pa, pb, za and zb. A possible explanation is 
that when one of the firms has a very strong inherited position, there are few customers 
to poach and, therefore, a decrease of the prices on that segment will not have negative 
consequences over the firm’s profits. In this situation, the loyal customer base is seen as 
big enough to support all the expenses related to the increase of the costs, without 
choosing to switch firms. 
 
Profits 
 From proposition 2 and the profit expressions, it is possible to find the equilibrium 
profits for firms A and B. 
 In equilibrium, the profits of each firm are: 
πa=−
1
18
 
−2𝜎2−10𝜏2+4𝜎𝜏−20𝜏2𝑥1
2+2𝜃𝜎2+𝜃𝜏2+20𝜏2𝑥1−20𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1−4𝜃𝜎𝜏+20𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1
2−12𝜎𝜏𝑥1+12𝜃𝜎𝜏𝑥1
𝜏
 
πb=−
1
18
 
−2𝜎2−10𝜏2−8𝜎𝜏−20𝜏2𝑥1
2+2𝜃𝜎2+𝜃𝜏2+20𝜏2𝑥1−20𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1+8𝜃𝜎𝜏+20𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1
2+12𝜎𝜏𝑥1−12𝜃𝜎𝜏𝑥1
𝜏
 
 
 We will now analyse the impact of the different variables on the firms’ profits, as 
we previously did with the prices. The effect of 𝑥1 on the profits is not necessarily the 
same for every value of that variable.  
 
𝑑
𝑑𝑥1
(𝜋𝑎) =  − 
2
9
 (θ - 1)(3σ - 5τ + 10𝑥1)                                                         (11.1) 
𝑑
𝑑𝑥1
(𝜋𝑏) =   
2
9
 (θ - 1)(3σ + 5τ – 10𝑥1)                                                            (11.2) 
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From (11.1) it is possible to conclude that the impact of an increase in x1 over the 
profits of firm A is positive if (3σ - 5τ + 10𝑥1) > 0 and negative otherwise. From the 
expression, we can take that if 𝑥1 > 0.5 τ the impact is always positive. If that condition 
is not true, then it is possible for the impact to be negative if 3σ < -5τ + 10𝑥1. From (11.2) 
we can show that the same impact over the profits of firm B would only be positive if (3σ 
+ 5τ – 10𝑥1) < 0. That will never be true if 𝑥1 < 0.5 τ. If that condition does not hold, then 
the impact is positive as long as 3σ < 5τ + 10𝑥1. Therefore, on both cases, the conclusions 
depend on the transportation costs. 
Considering the assumption we have been using (τ = 1 and σ = 0.5), we have that 
the profits of firm A increase with 𝑥1 as long as 𝑥1 is higher than 0.35 and θ ≠ 1. As for 
the profits of firm B, an increase only takes place when x1 is higher than 0.65 and θ ≠ 1.  
This means that there is an area where the profits of both firms can increase 
simultaneously with the initial dominant position of firm A. In this case, that area is 𝑥1 є 
]0.65 , 1[. Therefore, we can conclude that when firm A has an inherited strong 
dominance, both firms would benefit from it. The exact opposite happens when A does 
not inherit a strong enough position. When that dominance is strong but not too strong, 
firm A can be the only one to benefit with 𝑥1. 
Regarding the portion of new consumers (θ), the effects over the profits are 
somewhat harder to analyse.  
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑎) =  − 
1
18
2𝜎2+𝜏2−4𝜎𝜏+20𝜏2𝑥1(𝑥1−1)+12𝜎𝜏𝑥1
𝜏
                                           (12.1) 
 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑏) =  − 
1
18
2𝜎2+𝜏2+8𝜎𝜏+20𝜏2𝑥1(𝑥1−1)−12𝜎𝜏𝑥1
𝜏
                                           (12.2) 
 
 However, the difference between the two derivatives is simple and depends on 
the position of the indifferent consumers regarding the middle of the segment. 
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑎) −
𝑑
𝑑𝜃
(𝜋𝑏) = − 
2
3
 (2𝑥1 − 1)                                                             (12.3) 
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This shows that when firm A has a strong base of loyal clients (𝑥1 > 0.5), the 
entrance of new customers benefits firm B more than firm A. When 𝑥1 < 0.5, the contrary 
is true. 
It is also important to check whether or not it is possible that only one firm benefits 
from the appearance of new consumers. Assume for simplification that the transportation 
costs are equal to 1 and that the substitution costs are equal to 0.5. In this scenario, there 
is always a firm benefiting from an increase on θ but if 𝑥1 is low enough or high enough 
there is also one firm that suffers a negative impact profit. For instance, if 𝑥1 < 0.26594 
only firm A benefits and the opposite happens when 𝑥1 > 0.73406. There is not any 
location of the consumers that impacts negatively the profits of both firms 
simultaneously.  
Furthermore, similarly to what happens with the impact of the location of the 
indifferent consumer, the impact of the substitution costs on the profits depends on the 
value of 𝑥1.  
𝑑
𝑑𝜎
(𝜋𝑎) =  − 
2
9τ
 (θ - 1)(σ - τ + 3τ𝑥1)                                                             (13.1) 
𝑑
𝑑𝜎
(𝜋𝑏) =  −
2
9τ
 (θ - 1)(σ + 2τ – 3τ𝑥1)                                                           (13.2) 
  
If (σ - τ + 3τ𝑥1) > 0, then the impact of σ on the profits of firm A is positive. The 
impact will always be positive if 𝑥1 >  
1
3
. If (σ + 2τ – 3τ𝑥1) > 0, the impact of σ on the 
profits of firm B is positive.  
Considering again that τ = 1 and σ = 0.5, the profits of firm A increase with σ as 
long as 𝑥1 is higher than 
1
6
 and θ ≠ 1. On the other hand, firm B’s profits only increase 
when 𝑥1 is less than 
5
6
 and θ ≠ 1.  This implies that there is an area where the profits of 
both firms can increase simultaneously with the switching costs. In this case, that area is 
𝑥1 є ]
1
6
 , 
5
6
[. Therefore, we can conclude that for both firms to benefit from an increase on 
the substitution costs, the market share of the firms in the previous period can’t be too 
high. If that happens, only the firm covering most of the market is benefited, which means 
 
 
 33 
that switching costs may hinder the expansion of smaller firms in the market, even when 
new consumers are entering the market. Indeed, for the smaller firm, it becomes hard to 
poach clients and, therefore, to raise its small market share, which remains small.          
Lastly, the effect of the transportation costs over the profits is the same for both 
firms. In our range of possible values for the variables, even if transportation costs may 
have a negative impact on the prices targeted to non-loyal old consumers, the overall 
effect of transportation costs on profits is always positive, which means both firms benefit 
from an increase of the transportation costs, in line with standard Hotelling models . 
 
Consumer surplus 
 The consumer surplus when both firms price discriminate is given by the 
expression: 
𝐶𝑆 = −
1
36
(
36𝑐𝜏−2𝜎2+44𝜏2+16𝜎𝜏−36𝛽𝜏+52𝜏2𝑥1
2+2𝜃𝜎2+𝜃𝜏2−52𝜏2𝑥1+52𝜃𝜏
2𝑥1−16𝜃𝜎𝜏
𝜏
 + 
−52𝜃𝜏2𝑥1
2
𝜏
)                                                                                                            (14) 
 
The computations behind the computation of the Equilibrium CS are presented 
in Appendix.  
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3.3. Comparative analysis 
 
In this section, we will compare the two scenarios previously considered, in terms 
of prices and its consequences to society. For simplification, we will assume τ = 1 and σ 
= 0.5, like we did before, as well the inexistence of marginal production costs for both 
firms (c=0).  
The only absolute conclusion that we can draw from the analysis of propositions 
1 and 2 is that new consumers to the market always pay a higher price when there is 
behaviour-based price discrimination. All others may pay higher or lower prices 
depending of both their past behaviour and the percentage of new consumers. For 
instance, the loyal customers of firm A and the clients poached by firm B (this group 
corresponds to the former firm A clients) pay a lower price with behaviour-based price 
discrimination unless 𝑥1 is very high and θ is low. When the loyal segment of firm A is 
small, the rival is not too interested in poaching strategies (firm B is uninterested in 
creating a special price – a lower price – to capture such a small group of clients, 
especially given the existence of switching costs that would aggravate the discount on the 
price). This reduces price competition. The same happens for big values of θ because a 
big segment of new customers implies a small segment of old customers and, hereby, a 
small loyal segment for firm A. On the other hand, clients poached by firm A and loyal 
firm B customers (former firm B clients) pay a higher price unless 𝑥1 and θ are high 
enough. A high 𝑥1 means a small loyal customer base for firm B. This relaxes competition 
on prices, since firm A has small interest in poaching those clients. With a high percentage 
of new clients, this interest is also reduced. The following graphic representations help 
clarifying these conclusions. A plus sign represents a higher price in the symmetric 
behaviour-based pricing model as opposition to the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing 
model10.  
 
                                                          
10 The domain in all the following figures is restricted to x1 > 0.5 because the asymmetric behavior-based 
pricing model is only valid with the assumption x1 > 
𝜎
τ
. 
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Figure 5 – Sign of the difference between the price faced by loyal firm A clients in the behaviour-
based pricing model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Sign of the difference between the price faced by the clients poached by firm A in the 
behaviour-based pricing model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
- 
- 
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Figure 7 – Sign of the difference between the price faced by loyal firm B clients in the behaviour-
based pricing model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Sign of the difference between the price faced by the clients poached by firm B in the 
behaviour-based pricing model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
 
- 
- 
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 Regarding the profits, it is not surprising that firm B is benefitted when able to 
also price discriminate, as it is able to respond to the rival’s strategy using a similar 
strategy. On the other hand, firm A’s profits can either increase or decrease when firm B 
is also able to price discriminate (in comparison to the case where only firm A is able to 
price discriminate). In most cases, firm B’s ability to price discriminate results in a 
decrease of the profits of firm A, compared to the situation where its rival was not able to 
separate clients. However, for high enough values of 𝑥1 or θ the profits increase. In fact, 
with a high percentage of new clients in the market, firm A can benefit from the higher 
prices those clients pay (in comparison to the situation when only firm A price 
discriminates). Also, the existence of a strong base of clients loyal to firm A can result, 
as mentioned above, in less competition in that segment, allowing firm A to profit more 
than if firm B was unable to price discriminate. In the following figures, a plus sign 
represents higher profits in the symmetric behaviour-based pricing model as opposition 
to the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
 
Figure 9 – Sign of the difference between the profits of firm A in the behaviour-based pricing 
model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
- 
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 Moreover, consumers can also be better off or worse off when both firms segment 
clients and price discriminate accordingly. Given the assumptions made about τ, σ and c, 
consumers benefit from this situation in the interval below.  
 
 
Figure 10 – Sign of the difference between the consumer surplus in the behaviour-based pricing 
model and the asymmetric behaviour-based pricing model. 
 
Proof: see Appendix  
  
- 
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3.4. Comparative analysis of the welfare consequences between our 
model and Gehrig et al. (2011) 
 
 Gehrig et al. (2011) studies a static duopoly model in which only one of the firms 
is able to price discriminate. There is an incumbent firm, which used to be a monopolist, 
and an entrant. The entrant is still unable to access enough information about the clients 
to segment them. On the other hand, the incumbent firm can distinguish between the 
clients who were already in the market and those who are new to the market. This 
information asymmetry implies that, while the incumbent firm is able to price 
discriminate between the two types of clients, the entrant has to set a single price for all 
of them.  
 Our model considers a similar situation. However, although our model only has 
one period of strategic competition, firms are confronted with past choices. It is, therefore, 
assumed the existence of previous competition between both firms.11 Thus, we can 
compare the consequences of the equilibrium prices of both models to consumers and 
firms. For this comparison, we will consider the scenarios 3.1 and 3.2. This means we 
will compare both the situation in which the information asymmetry remains over time 
and the situation in which that asymmetry only lasts one period with the conclusions of 
Gehrig et al. (2011). Recall that in Gehrig et al. (2011) it is not considered the possibility 
of the entrant firm being able to override the gap in terms of information. This is will give 
us a wider view of the possible impacts of the information asymmetry to society, given 
that the results depend on the decisions made in the past. Therefore, 𝑥1 is the main factor 
of differentiation between the models. Furthermore, in our model the segmentation is 
made between three types of clients (loyal, poached and new), while in Gehrig et al. 
(2011) there are only two groups of clients (old and new). Lastly, Gehrig et al. (2011) 
does not consider the symmetric scenario. For comparison purposes, we will assume that 
those clients who, in our two-set ups, were, in the past, clients of firm B would, in Gehrig 
et al. (2011), be clients of the monopolist firm. In other words, even though they had a 
preference for firm B, they would not abandon the market as long as there was a firm 
                                                          
11 Such setting can be applied to situations in which the management of a firm changes and inherits a 
certain market or to regulated markets facing a new incentive to the liberalization of competition. 
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producing the good. Therefore, pb and qa will be compared with pbg and pag, respectively. 
pbg and pag are the prices in Gehrig et al. (2011). 
 For simplification, we have considered similar costs for both firms. Therefore, in 
the following comparison, we will assume the marginal costs in Gehrig et al. (2011) to 
be equal as well.  
 As in the previous section, we will assume τ = 1, σ = 0.5 and c=0 to draw practical 
conclusions from the expressions obtained while comparing the models. 
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3.4.1. Asymmetric behaviour-based pricing in both models 
 
 The equilibrium pricess in Gehrig et al. (2011) are: 
 pag =  τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
  
 zag =  τ +
6c−(1−θ)σ
6
 
 pbg =  τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
The equilibrium profits in Gehrig et al. (2011) are: 
πag = - 
1
72
 
−4σ²−36τ²+5θ²σ²−24στ−θσ²+8c²+24θστ
𝜏
 
 πbg = 
−((1−θ)σ+3τ)²
18τ
 
Proof: see Appendix  
 
 The consumer surplus in Gehrig et al. (2011) is: 
 CSg = β + 
8c²−8c(c+(1−θ)σ+9τ)−8c(9τ−(1−θ)σ)+θσ(σ+72τ)+4(σ²−18στ−45τ²)−5θ²σ²
144τ
 
Proof: see Appendix  
 
 Comparing the prices from both models, we can observe that in our model (see 
proposition 1) all consumers pay a smaller price than in Gehrig et al. (2011).  
Given the equilibrium profits found on section 3.1 and taking in consideration the 
assumptions about τ, σ and c, the profits of firm A are smaller than the profits in Gehrig 
et al. (2011)’s static model. For most values, the same remains true for the profits of firm 
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B. However, when firm A has a very strong base of loyal clients from the past (high x1), 
especially when accompanied by a small percentage of new clients in the market, firm B 
can have higher profits in our model. In the literature when there is more than one period 
and, consequently, former customer decisions become a necessary part of the pricing 
strategy, firms are not able to maintain profits as high as those achieved in a single 
period.12 Our model, although static, seems to corroborate this idea for the most part, as 
the consideration of past decisions as part of the pricing strategy appears to be detrimental 
for the firms in the great majority of situations. (as opposed to the situation in which those 
decisions are not considered). However, it does not assume it as a necessary result. In 
situations in which clients have formerly shown a clear preference for the dominant firm 
(a situation very close to a monopoly), the profits of its rival can be higher when past 
decisions are taken into consideration in the pricing strategies. 
 The opposite happens to the consumer surplus. When past decisions are 
considered in the model, customers are benefitted because they face lower prices in our 
asymmetric model.  
 The proof of this section’s results can be found in Appendix. 
  
                                                          
12 This result is in line, for example, with Fudenberg and Tirole (2000). 
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3.4.2. Symmetric behaviour-based pricing 
 
 We will now proceed to comparing Gehrig et al. (2011) with the version of our 
model presented in section 3.2.  
 From the comparison between the equilibrium prices in Gehrig et al. (2011) and 
those on proposition 2, it is possible to conclude that old consumers who buy from A 
always pay a lower price in our model.  As for the clients of firm B, poached clients also 
pay a lower price in our model, but loyal clients may face a higher price (which happens 
when firm A has a relatively small base of loyal clients from the previous period). New 
consumers pay higher prices in our model, regardless of the firm they prefer.  
 
 
Figure 11 – Sign of the difference between the price paid by clients loyal to firm B in our 
behaviour-based pricing model and in Gehrig et al. (2011). 
 
Considering the equilibrium profits found in both models, we cannot draw an 
immediate conclusion about which scenario is most benefits the firms. Assuming τ = 1, 
σ = 0.5 and c=0, we have that the profits of the incumbent firm are almost always higher 
in Gehrig et al. (2011), which is understandable given the fact that the rival is unable to 
price discriminate in the model. However, for values of 𝑥1 very close to one, the opposite 
- 
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happens. These are situations in which the base of loyal clients of firm A is so high that 
we are close to Gehrig et al. (2011)’s assumption of the previous existence of a monopoly. 
In fact, the big difference between the two modelling options is the consideration of an 
inherited loyal base of clients (x1) towards firm A. Those loyal clients, who face switching 
costs, seem to be enough to guarantee higher profits for firm A, regardless of firm B’s 
ability to price discriminate. In the same way, firm B can either benefit or not from the 
possibility of price discriminating. For most values of 𝑥1 and θ, firm B is benefitted in 
our symmetric behaviour-based pricing model as opposed to the asymmetric model 
presented in Gehrig et al. (2011). However, when 𝑥1 is relatively high but not overly high 
and θ is also not too high, the contrary can happen. In fact, there is an interval of values 
in which firm B is better off in Gehrig et al. (2011) than in the symmetric price 
discrimination set-up of our model. This means that if firm A has a relatively strong but 
not too strong previous loyal client base and the segment of new clients is not too big, 
firm B may be harmed by its own ability to price discriminate. This may be a result of 
including past decisions in the firms’ pricing strategies in our model. 
 Consumers are always better off in our behaviour-based price discrimination 
model than in Gehrig et al. (2011).  
The differences between the conclusions of the two models show both the 
importance of considering choices made in the past and the impact of eliminating an 
information asymmetry between firms (that may exist as a result, for example, of entering 
the market at different times or having access to different technologies).  
The proof of the results presented in the section can be consulted in Appendix.  
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this dissertation, we studied the effects of history-based price discrimination on 
consumers and firms in a context where firms had an inherited base of loyal clients. We 
also analyzed the impact of an information asymmetry regarding the clients’ past 
behaviour. In fact, we presented two scenarios of a duopoly market: one where such 
asymmetry was present, with only one of the firms being capable of price discriminating, 
and another where both firms had an equal ability to use that pricing strategy. This can 
be interpreted as a comparison between a scenario where a relatively new firm in the 
market still has no access to client’s history unlike the older firm (the information 
asymmetry is lasting) and a scenario where the asymmetry immediately disappears. Both 
these situations were also compared to a similar model, Gehrig et al. (2011), where former 
consumer decisions are not considered. 
Regarding the asymmetric price discriminating model, we concluded that having 
a strong base of loyal clients is a strategic advantage for the price discriminating firm, as 
it creates conditions for stronger poaching strategies: an increase on the prices set to the 
loyal clients allows the setting of lower prices to the rival’s clients. Substitution costs are 
an instrument that can be used to apply such strategies (an increase on these costs may 
result in lower prices to the clients the firm aims to poach, which is compensated by an 
increase on the prices to loyal clients). Also, unlike the standard Hotelling results, an 
increase on transportation costs does not necessarily result on an increase of prices. 
Indeed, when the price discriminating firm has a strong dominance, an increase on those 
costs may be fully supported by the loyal clients, allowing the firm to, once again, set 
lower prices to its rival’s clients for poaching purposes.  
However, it is when comparing this set-up with the set-up without an information 
asymmetry between firms that some of the most interesting conclusions emerge. For 
instance, it becomes clear that both the expansion of the market and the consumers’ past 
decisions have important implications in the profitability of the firms. With an 
information asymmetry between the two firms, prices are higher with the entry of new 
clients. This entry always benefits the non-discriminating firm, but, in many cases, harms 
the price discriminating firm. The reason behind this is the fact that the entry of new 
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customers in the market means a smaller percentage of old customers, which reduces the 
portion of loyal clients (and, consequently, the associated strategic advantage). Without 
any information asymmetry, conclusions are not very different. Even though there is no 
longer any difference in the ability of strategically using price discrimination for poaching 
reasons, the expansion of the market still influences the firms’ performance. For instance, 
when one firm has an inherited position significantly stronger than the other, only the 
smaller firm benefits from the expansion of the market. This seems to indicate that the 
entry of new consumers in a market plays an important role to attenuate the dominance 
of a firm. Without it, that dominance might prevail over time and limit the expansion of 
smaller firms. Thus, in both the cases, the entry of new customers works a tool to reduce 
the advantage of the most powerful firms, whether that advantage comes from the access 
to different technologies or from having a much bigger market share.   
Globally, the symmetric model always assures higher profits for the firm that, in 
the asymmetric model, was unable to price discriminate, which does not come as a 
surprise. For the firm that always has the ability of price discriminating, that is not always 
the case. In fact, both scenarios can happen. For its profits to be higher without the 
information asymmetry, it is necessary to have a strong base of loyal clients or a 
significant entry of new customers in the market. For the customers it seems preferable 
to have a scenario with information asymmetry, unless the market is almost stagnant and 
the dominant firm has a strong dominance (but not close to being a monopoly). This 
appears to have a direct connection with the behaviour of the prices. The prices for the 
new customers are always higher when both firms price discriminate, but for old 
customers that depends of the entry of new clients and the past decisions. When all prices 
for old customers are smaller in the symmetric model, customers are better-off with both 
firms price discriminating. However, as mentioned, this situation only happens under very 
specific conditions. So, it might be of the interest of consumers to keep their preferences 
(purchasing history) hidden as much as possible to, at least, make it difficult to newer 
firms to have access to it, especially in growing markets. New consumers, for example, 
have no interest of letting the firms know they have never participated in the market 
before. This might be accomplished, for example, through the possibility of deleting 
cookies. If consumers are capable of erasing the track of their previous purchases, it 
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becomes much harder for firms to segment their clients and set different prices for each 
segment.  
Different conclusions were found when comparing our symmetric model with 
Gehrig et al. (2011), which, once again, shows how considering past decisions changes 
the conclusions of the models. In fact, when using Gehrig et al. (2011) instead of our 
asymmetric set-up, we found eliminating the information asymmetry to always be 
beneficial for the consumers. As for the firms, the conclusions regarding the profits of the 
price discriminating firm were very similar. However, in some situations, the other firm 
was found to profit more when incapable of price discriminating, unlike what happened 
when considering our asymmetric model. 
Lastly, through the comparison of our asymmetric model with Gehrig et al. 
(2011), it becomes clear that incorporating past decisions into the pricing strategies is 
beneficial for consumers, as it lowers all prices. Firms on the other hand are harmed by 
this factor, as predicted in the existent literature. Our model, however, finds an exception 
to these results. When there is a strong preference for the price discriminating firm, the 
other firm might benefit from considering past decisions when setting the prices. 
In this dissertation, we have analyzed the impact of behaviour-based price 
discrimination in a context of information asymmetry. For that purpose, we used a static 
approach that assumed previous interaction on the market. Therefore, we considered an 
exogenous market-share (interpreted as the loyal base of clients of one of the firms). This 
leaves space for future research in this area, namely through a similar study in a dynamic 
setting to verify how our conclusions hold in a longer horizon. 
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5. Appendix 
 
Proof of proposition 1 
In game theory, the best response is the strategy or strategies that produce the most 
favourable outcome for a player, given the strategies of the other players. This is a key 
concept to find the Nash equilibrium, which is the solution in which all players are using 
the best possible strategy and, therefore, have nothing to gain by changing it, considering 
the opponent’s decisions.   
Through the maximization of the profit functions of both firms in order to the each 
of the prices set by them, we can find the best response functions. The best response 
functions in this model are: 
 
pa =  
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜎 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
pb;    qa =  
1
2
𝑐 −
1
2
𝜎 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
pb − 𝜏𝑥1;     za =  
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
pb 
pb = − 
1
(2𝜃−4)
(2𝑐 + pa + qa − 𝑐𝜃 + 𝜃𝜏 + 2𝜏𝑥1 − 𝜃pa + 𝜃za − 2𝜃𝜏𝑥1) 
 
These functions show that the prices from firm A don’t interact with each other. 
Instead, each of them interacts with pb individually, as if we had different segments with 
an independent size. It is interesting to notice that in the market of firm B’s old clients, 
firm A sets a lower price with the switching costs and sets a discount with 𝑥1. This means 
that the higher 𝑥1 is, the lower will qa be. This might happen because when 𝑥1 is high, it 
is expected that the rival’s clients face a big transportation cost to buy from A. To oppose 
this effect, firm A sets a lower price for them.  Firm B also sets a discount associated with 
𝑥1, in order to poach the maximum possible clients from firm A. 
Also, the best response functions allow us to obtain proposition 1. We do so by 
solving a four-equation system with those functions.  
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Proof of the result in (8) 
In order to determine the consumer surplus, we use the following expression: 
Consumer Surplus = (1 – θ) (∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑎 − 𝜏𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +
𝑥𝑎
0
∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥) −
𝑥1
𝑥𝑎
𝜎)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑞𝑎 − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥))𝑑𝑥
1
𝑥𝑏
𝑥𝑏
𝑥1
) + 𝜃(∫ (𝛽 − 𝑧𝑎 −
𝑥𝑛
0
𝜏𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥))𝑑𝑥)
1
𝑥𝑛
 
 
Using the prices found in proposition 1 and the resulting expressions of the various 
indifferent consumers, we get (8).  
 
Proof of proposition 2 
To find the best response functions, we have to maximize the profits expression 
of each firm in order to each of the possible prices.  
The best response functions in this model are: 
 
pa =  
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜎 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
qb;                                    pb = 
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜎 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
qa; 
qa =  
1
2
𝑐 −
1
2
𝜎 +
1
2
𝜏(2𝑥1 − 1) +
1
2
pa;                    qb =  
1
2
𝑐 −
1
2
𝜎 −
1
2
𝜏(2𝑥1 − 1) +
1
2
pb 
z =  
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
zb;                                                 zb =  
1
2
𝑐 +
1
2
𝜏 +
1
2
za 
 
These functions show the prices only interact in groups of two, as if we had 
different segments with an independent size. It is interesting to notice that in the market 
of firm A’s old clients, firm B sets a lower price with the switching costs and sets a 
discount if 𝑥1 < 0.5. Otherwise, the price increases with 𝑥1. The opposite happens with 
price set by firm A to the old clients of firm B. A possible explanation for this fact might 
be that when a firm has a big base of loyal clients the main concern will be to keep those 
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clients instead of poaching new ones to avoid an unnecessary price war. When the loyal 
clients are only a small portion of the total of clients in the market, there will be a need to 
practice lower prices to extend the number of clients of the firm. 
By solving a system with the best response functions, we can obtain proposition 
2. 
 
Proof of the result in (14) 
In order to determine the consumer surplus, we use the following expression: 
Consumer Surplus =  (1 − 𝜃) (∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑎 − 𝜏𝑥)𝑑𝑥 +
𝑥𝑎
0
∫ (𝛽 − 𝑞𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥) −
𝑥1
𝑥𝑎
𝜎)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑞𝑎 − 𝜏𝑥 − 𝜎)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑝𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥))𝑑𝑥
1
𝑥𝑏
𝑥𝑏
𝑥1
) + 𝜃(∫ (𝛽 − 𝑧𝑎 −
𝑥𝑛
0
𝜏𝑥)𝑑𝑥 + ∫ (𝛽 − 𝑧𝑏 − 𝜏(1 − 𝑥))𝑑𝑥)
1
𝑥𝑛
 
 
Using the prices found in proposition 2 and the resulting expressions of the various 
indifferent consumers, we get (14).  
 
Proof of section in 3.3 
We start by calculating the differences between the prices practiced in the 
symmetric behaviour-based price discrimination model (indentified with a 2) and in the 
asymmetric behaviour-based price discrimination model (identified with a 1): 
 
 pa2 – pa1 = c + 
1
3
σ + 
1
3
τ + 
2
3
τ𝑥1 – [c + 
𝜎
2
 + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
] = −
1
6
−2σ−4τ+θσ+6τx₁−2θτ𝑥₁
θ−2
 
qa2 – qa1 = c - 
1
3
σ + τ - 
4
3
τ𝑥1 – [ c − 
𝜎
2
 −  
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−5𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1+4
𝜃−2
] = 
1
6
−2σ−4τ+θσ+4θτ+6τx₁−4θτ𝑥₁
θ−2
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za2 – za1 = c + τ – [c + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
] = - 
1
3
 τ (𝑥1 - 2) 
θ−1
θ−2
 
pb2 – pb1 = c + 
1
3
σ + τ - 
2
3
τ𝑥1 – [c + 
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−2𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1−2
𝜃−2
] = 
1
3
−2σ−4τ+θσ+4θτ+6τx₁−4θτ𝑥₁
θ−2
 
qb2 – pb1 = c - 
1
3
σ - 
1
3
τ + 
4
3
τ𝑥1 – [c +  
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−2𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1−2
𝜃−2
] = 
−
1
3
−2σ−4τ+θσ+6τx₁−2θτ𝑥₁
θ−2
 
zb2 – pb1 =  c + τ – [c + 
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−2𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1−2
𝜃−2
] = - 
2
3
 τ (𝑥1 - 2) 
θ−1
θ−2
 
 
Making each expression equal to zero, assuming τ = 1, σ = 0.5 and c = 0, and 
solving it in order to θ, we obtain the values of θ for which there is no difference between 
the given prices, as a function of x1. Then, we can easily conclude for which intervals each 
difference is positive or negative. It is important to remember that both x1 and θ belong 
to the interval ]0 ,1[. The conclusions were the following: 
 
pa2 – pa1 depends on x1 and θ 
qa2 – qa1 depends on x1 and θ 
za2 – za1 > 0 
pb2 – pb1 depends on x1 and θ 
qb2 – pb1 depends on x1 and θ 
zb2 – pb1 > 0 
 
For a better understanding of the signs of each expression, the expressions were 
plotted and we got figures 5 – 8.  
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We follow the same reasoning for both the profits and the consumer surplus:
  
πa2 - πa1 = 
1
36
 (θ-1) (
−10σ²+8τ²−16στ+54τ²𝑥₁²+5θσ²−48τ²𝑥₁+32θτ²𝑥₁+8θστ−32θτ²𝑥₁² 
τ(θ−2)
 
+
12στ𝑥₁−6θσ𝜏𝑥₁
τ(θ−2)
) 
πb2 – πb1 = - 
1
9
 (θ-1) (
−2σ2−8τ2−8στ−18τ2𝑥₁2+θσ2+24τ2𝑥₁−8θτ2𝑥₁+4θστ+8θτ2𝑥₁ 
τ(θ−2)
 
+ 
12στ𝑥₁−6θστ𝑥₁
τ(θ−2)
) 
CS2 – CS1 =  
1
72
 (θ − 1) 
−8σ²−11τ²−8στ−36τ²𝑥₁²+4θσ²+36τ²𝑥₁−14θτ²𝑥₁+4θστ+14θτ²𝑥₁² 
τ(θ−2)
  
 
After equalizing each expression to zero: 
πa2 - πa1 depends on x1 and θ 
πb2 – πb1 > 0 
CS2 – CS1 depends on x1 and θ 
 
For a better understanding of the signs of the expressions πa2 - πa1 and CS2 – CS1 
we plotted them and got figures 9 and 10.  
 
Proof of 3.4 
 From Gehrig et al. (2011) we have: 
 
 pag =  τ +
(2+θ)σ+4ca+2cb
6
  
 zag =  τ +
4ca+2cb−(1−θ)σ
6
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 pbg =  τ +
3cb+ca−(1−θ)σ
3
 
πag =  
(4(ca−cb)²−8ca(cb+(1−θ)σ+3τ)+8cb((1−θ)σ+3τ)+θσ(σ−24τ)+4(σ²+6στ+9τ²)−5θ²σ²)
72𝜏
 
πbg = 
(ca−cb−(1−θ)σ+3τ)²
18τ
 
CSg =β + 
4(ca
2+cb
2)−8ca(cb+(1−θ)σ+9τ)−8cb(9τ−(1−θ)σ)+θσ(σ+72τ)+4(σ²−18στ−45τ²)−5θ²σ²
144τ
 
 
In our model, we assume both firms face the same marginal production costs. In 
order to better compare these results with our results, we will make the same assumption 
for Gehrig et al. (2011). Under our assumption (ca = cb = c), we have: 
 
 pa =  τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
  
 za =  τ +
6c−(1−θ)σ
6
 
 pb =  τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 
πa = - 
1
72
 
−4σ²−36τ²+5θ²σ²−24στ−θσ²+8c²+24θστ
𝜏
 
 πb = 
−((1−θ)σ+3τ)²
18τ
 
 CS = β + 
8c²−8c(c+(1−θ)σ+9τ)−8c(9τ−(1−θ)σ)+θσ(σ+72τ)+4(σ²−18στ−45τ²)−5θ²σ²
144τ
 
 
 
Proof of section in 3.4.1 
We start by calculating the differences between the profits in our asymmetric 
behaviour-based price discrimination model (indentified with a 1) and in Gehrig et al. 
(2011)’s model (identified with a g). Then, we do the same for the consumer surplus: 
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pa1 – pag = c + 
𝜎
2
 + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
 – [τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
] = −
1
6
 (𝜃 − 1)
−2𝜎+4𝜏+𝜃𝜎−2𝜏𝑥1
𝜃−2
 
qa1 – pag =  c − 
𝜎
2
 −  
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−5𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1+4
𝜃−2
−  [τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
 ] = −
1
6(𝜃−2)
(3𝜃𝜎 −
4𝜏 − 10𝜎 + 4𝜃𝜏 − 10𝜏𝑥1 + 𝜃
2𝜎 + 4𝜃𝜏𝑥1) 
za1 – zag = c + 
1
3
 τ 
𝜃−𝑥1+𝜃𝑥1−4
𝜃−2
− [τ +
6c−(1−θ)σ
6
 ] = 
−
1
6
 
−4𝜎−4𝜏+4𝜃𝜏−10𝜏𝑥1+𝜃
2𝜎+4𝜃𝜏𝑥1
𝜃−2
 
pb1 – pbg = c + 
1
3
 τ 
−𝜃−2𝑥1+2𝜃𝑥1−2
𝜃−2
− [τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 ] = 
1
3
 
𝜃−1
𝜃−2
 (2𝜎 − 4𝜏 − 𝜃𝜎 +
2𝜏𝑥1) 
πa1 - πag = - 
1
72τ(θ−2)
 (- 8c²θ + 16c² - 5θ³σ² + 29θ²σ² + 36θ²στx₁ - 24θ²στ + 16θ²τ²x₁² 
- 16θ²τ²x₁ + 4θ²τ² - 52θσ² - 108θστx₁ + 72θστ - 68θτ²x₁² + 80θτ²x₁ + 4θτ² + 28σ² + 72στx₁ 
- 48στ + 52τ²x₁² - 64τ²x₁ - 8τ²) 
πb1 - πbg = - 
1
18τ
 
θ−1
θ−2
 (θ²σ² - 3θσ² + 6θστ + 4θτ²x₁² + θτ² + 2σ² - 12στ - 4τ²x₁² - 8τ²x₁ 
+ 14τ²)   
CS1 – CSg = 
1
144
  
θ−1
θ−2
 (5θ²σ² - 24θσ² + 108θστx₁ - 72θστ - 16θτ²x₁² + 16θτ²x₁ - 4θτ² 
+ 28σ² - 216στx₁ + 144στ + 52τ²x₁² - 160τ²x₁ + 184τ²) 
 
Making each expression equal to zero, assuming τ = 1, σ = 0.5 and c = 0 and 
solving it in order to θ, we obtain the values of θ for which the variables in both models 
share the same value, as function of x1. From there, we can conclude for which intervals 
each difference is positive or negative. It is important to remember that both x1 and θ 
belong to the interval ]0 ,1[. The conclusions were the following: 
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pa1 – pag < 0 
qa1 – pag < 0 
za1 – zag < 0 
pb1 – pbg < 0 
πa1 - πag < 0 
πb1 - πbg depends on x1 and θ (we tested different values to get to the conclusions 
in our paper) 
CS1 – CSg > 0 
 
Proof of section in 3.4.2 
The first step is to calculate the differences between the prices in our symmetric 
behaviour-based price discrimination model (indentified with a 2) and in Gehrig et al. 
(2011)’s model (identified with a g). Then, we do the same for the profits and the 
consumer surplus: 
 
pa2 – pag = c + 
1
3
σ + 
1
3
τ + 
2
3
τ𝑥1 – [τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
 ] = 
1
3
𝜎 −
2
3
𝜏 +
2
3
𝜏𝑥1 −
1
6
𝜎(𝜃 + 2) 
qa2 – pag = c - 
1
3
σ + τ - 
4
3
τ𝑥1 – [ τ +
(2+θ)σ+6c
6
 ] = −
1
3
𝜎 −
4
3
𝜏𝑥1 −
1
6
𝜎(𝜃 + 2) 
za2 – zag = c + τ – [τ +
6c−(1−θ)σ
6
 ] = - 
1
6
 σ (θ - 1)  
pb2 – pbg = c + 
1
3
σ + τ - 
2
3
τ𝑥1 – [τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 ] = 
1
3
𝜎 −
2
3
𝜏𝑥1 −
1
3
𝜎(𝜃 − 1) 
qb2 – pbg = c - 
1
3
σ - 
1
3
τ + 
4
3
τ𝑥1 – [τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 ] = 
4
3
𝜏𝑥1 −
4
3
𝜏 −
1
3
𝜎 −
1
3
𝜎(𝜃 + 2) 
zb2 – pbg =  c + τ – [τ +
3c−(1−θ)σ
3
 ] = - 
1
3
 σ (θ - 1) 
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 πa2 - πag = 
1
72𝜏
 (8c² + 5θ²σ² - 9θσ² - 48θστx₁ + 40θστ - 80θτ²x₁² + 80θτ²x₁ - 4θτ² + 
4σ² + 48στx₁ - 40στ + 80τ²x₁² - 80τ²x₁ + 4τ²) 
πb2 – πbg = - 
1
18τ
 (θ-1) (σ² + τ² + 14στ + 20τ²x₁² + θσ² - 20τ²x₁ - 12στx₁) 
CS2 – CSg = - 
1
144τ
 (θ-1) (4σ² + 4τ² + 8στ - 208τ²x₁² - 5θσ² + 208τ²x₁) 
 
Making each expression equal to zero, assuming τ = 1, σ = 0.5 and c = 0 and 
solving it in order to θ, we obtain the values of θ for which there is no difference between 
the prices, as function of x1. Then, we can easily conclude for which intervals each 
difference is positive or negative. It is important to remember that both x1 and θ belong 
to the interval ]0 ,1[. The conclusions were the following: 
pa2 – pag < 0 
qa2 – pag < 0 
za2 – zag > 0 
pb2 – pbg depends on x1 and θ (we tested different values to get to the conclusions 
in our paper). 
qb2 – pbg < 0 
zb2 – pbg > 0 
πa2 - πag depends on x1 and θ (we tested different values to get to the conclusions 
in our paper). 
πb2 – πbg depends on x1 and θ (we tested different values to get to the conclusions 
in our paper). 
CS2 – CSg > 0 
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